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  This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of 
Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which 
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I am grateful to Diego Moreno and Myrna Wooders for helpful conversations and to Matthew 
O. Jackson and Jeroen M. Swinkels for kind and valuable comments Jackson and Swinkels (2005) proved the existence of equilibrium with posi-
tive probability of trade for private value auctions (Theorem 15). This impor-
tant theorem was established with great ingenuity, but there is a slight error in
the last part of its proof, on p. 137. In the penultimate inequality, a δ appears
on the right hand side which is absent in the previous inequality. Thus, the
term ω
k should be dropped from the right in the last inequality. This is not yet
suﬃcient to break the argument, but the observation that ζ can be bounded
above by 2M ω
k is.
The following modiﬁcation in the proof is suﬃcient. The deﬁnition of
the modiﬁed auction Ax,f o rx ∈ {3,4,...} is changed to the following: with
probability 1/x, a non-strategic player n +1has endowment en+1 =   and
submits   sell oﬀers which are all equal to a random variable uniform on [w,w];
with probability 1/x, en+1 =0and n +1submits   buy oﬀers which are all
equal to a random variable uniform in [w,w]. For such a game, most of the
arguments given in the original proof work without changes.1 The modiﬁcation
is in what follows.
Since player in ix ∈ H is (occasionally) a buyer, there is a probability ζ>0
that such a player has an endowment of at most  −1 units.2 Deﬁne E00
1 as the
event where Qx
B,n+1 > 0 and ix has endowment of at most   − 1 units. Deﬁne
E0
1 and E1 as before. Again, we have Prx (E1) ≥ ζˆ µx.3
If E1 = E0
1, ix h a sn os e l lb i d sa to rb e l o ww − 2δ and there is at least one
buy bid above w − 2δ.I fE1 = E00
1, ix has at most   − 1 sell bids at or below
w − 2δ (because she has only   − 1 u n i t s ) ,w h i l et h e r ea r ea tl e a s t  buy bids
above w − 2δ. Then, under E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3j, j sells at least one extra object by
dj.
The rest of the argument works.4
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1The limitation to the probability Pr x(Qx
B >  ) was based on the argument that this
event will occur only if more than two players bid above w − 2δ. This remains true.
2Such ζ cannot be limited by 2M ω
k as before.
3This limitation is also suﬃcient to use the consequences of (6). I thank Prof. Swinkels
for this observation.
4There is a typo in (5): the n in the right hand side should be n+1. Similar replacements
should be done in its consequences.
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